CVE-2021-29475

{"id": "CVE-2021-29475", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV2": [{"type": "Primary", "source": "nvd@nist.gov", "cvssData": {"version": "2.0", "baseScore": 5.8, "accessVector": "NETWORK", "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N", "authentication": "NONE", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "accessComplexity": "MEDIUM", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 4.9, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "exploitabilityScore": 8.6, "obtainUserPrivilege": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false}], "cvssMetricV31": [{"type": "Primary", "source": "nvd@nist.gov", "cvssData": {"scope": "CHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 10.0, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"}, "impactScore": 5.8, "exploitabilityScore": 3.9}, {"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "cvssData": {"scope": "CHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 10.0, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"}, "impactScore": 5.8, "exploitabilityScore": 3.9}]}, "published": "2021-04-26T19:15:08.507", "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/hedgedoc/hedgedoc/commit/c1789474020a6d668d616464cb2da5e90e123f65", "tags": ["Patch", "Third Party Advisory"], "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}, {"url": "https://github.com/hedgedoc/hedgedoc/security/advisories/GHSA-pxxg-px9v-6qf3", "tags": ["Third Party Advisory"], "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}], "vulnStatus": "Analyzed", "weaknesses": [{"type": "Primary", "source": "nvd@nist.gov", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-918"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-94"}]}, {"type": "Secondary", "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-918"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-94"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "HedgeDoc (formerly known as CodiMD) is an open-source collaborative markdown editor. An attacker is able to receive arbitrary files from the file system when exporting a note to PDF. Since the code injection has to take place as note content, there fore this exploit requires the attackers ability to modify a note. This will affect all instances, which have pdf export enabled. This issue has been fixed by https://github.com/hedgedoc/hedgedoc/commit/c1789474020a6d668d616464cb2da5e90e123f65 and is available in version 1.5.0. Starting the CodiMD/HedgeDoc instance with `CMD_ALLOW_PDF_EXPORT=false` or set `\"allowPDFExport\": false` in config.json can mitigate this issue for those who cannot upgrade. This exploit works because while PhantomJS doesn't actually render the `file:///` references to the PDF file itself, it still uses them internally, and exfiltration is possible, and easy through JavaScript rendering. The impact is pretty bad, as the attacker is able to read the CodiMD/HedgeDoc `config.json` file as well any other files on the filesystem. Even though the suggested Docker deploy option doesn't have many interesting files itself, the `config.json` still often contains sensitive information, database credentials, and maybe OAuth secrets among other things."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "\"HedgeDoc (antes se conoce como CodiMD) es un editor colaborativo de c\u00f3digo abierto. Un atacante es capaz de recibir archivos arbitrarios del sistema de archivos al exportar una nota a PDF. Dado que la inyecci\u00f3n de c\u00f3digo presente que toma lugar como contenido de la nota, esta explotaci\u00f3n requiere la habilidad de los atacantes para modificar una nota. Esto afectar\u00e1 a todas las instancias que tengan habilitada la exportaci\u00f3n a PDF. Este problema ha sido corregido por https://github.com/hedgedoc/hedgedoc/commit/c1789474020a6d668d616464cb2da5e90e123f65 y est\u00e1 disponible en versi\u00f3n 1.5.0. Iniciar la instancia de CodiMD/HedgeDoc con \"\"CMD_ALLOW_PDF_EXPORT=false\"\" o ajustar \"\"allowPDFExport\"\": false\"\" en config.json puede mitigar este problema para aquellos que no puedan actualizar. Esta explotaci\u00f3n funciona porque aunque PhantomJS no renderiza realmente las referencias \"\"file:///\"\" al archivo PDF en s\u00ed, sigue us\u00e1ndolas internamente, y la exfiltraci\u00f3n es posible, y f\u00e1cil por medio del renderizado de JavaScript. El impacto es bastante malo, ya que el atacante es capaz de leer el archivo CodiMD/HedgeDoc \"\"config.json\"\" as\u00ed como cualquier otro archivo en el sistema de archivos. Aunque la opci\u00f3n de despliegue de Docker sugerida no presenta muchos archivos interesantes en s\u00ed misma, el archivo \"\"config.json\"\" suele contener informaci\u00f3n confidencial, credenciales de bases de datos, y quiz\u00e1s secretos de OAuth entre otras cosas"}], "lastModified": "2022-08-03T10:24:01.697", "configurations": [{"nodes": [{"negate": false, "cpeMatch": [{"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:hedgedoc:hedgedoc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "matchCriteriaId": "664CACC3-C0B6-4494-8C2E-BD90BBB01EE5", "versionEndExcluding": "1.5.0"}], "operator": "OR"}]}], "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com"}