Vulnerabilities (CVE)

Filtered by vendor Bytecodealliance Subscribe
Filtered by product Cranelift-codegen
Total 6 CVE
CVE Vendors Products Updated CVSS v2 CVSS v3
CVE-2023-26489 1 Bytecodealliance 2 Cranelift-codegen, Wasmtime 2023-12-10 N/A 9.9 CRITICAL
wasmtime is a fast and secure runtime for WebAssembly. In affected versions wasmtime's code generator, Cranelift, has a bug on x86_64 targets where address-mode computation mistakenly would calculate a 35-bit effective address instead of WebAssembly's defined 33-bit effective address. This bug means that, with default codegen settings, a wasm-controlled load/store operation could read/write addresses up to 35 bits away from the base of linear memory. Due to this bug, however, addresses up to `0xffffffff * 8 + 0x7ffffffc = 36507222004 = ~34G` bytes away from the base of linear memory are possible from guest code. This means that the virtual memory 6G away from the base of linear memory up to ~34G away can be read/written by a malicious module. A guest module can, without the knowledge of the embedder, read/write memory in this region. The memory may belong to other WebAssembly instances when using the pooling allocator, for example. Affected embedders are recommended to analyze preexisting wasm modules to see if they're affected by the incorrect codegen rules and possibly correlate that with an anomalous number of traps during historical execution to locate possibly suspicious modules. The specific bug in Cranelift's x86_64 backend is that a WebAssembly address which is left-shifted by a constant amount from 1 to 3 will get folded into x86_64's addressing modes which perform shifts. For example `(i32.load (i32.shl (local.get 0) (i32.const 3)))` loads from the WebAssembly address `$local0 << 3`. When translated to Cranelift the `$local0 << 3` computation, a 32-bit value, is zero-extended to a 64-bit value and then added to the base address of linear memory. Cranelift would generate an instruction of the form `movl (%base, %local0, 8), %dst` which calculates `%base + %local0 << 3`. The bug here, however, is that the address computation happens with 64-bit values, where the `$local0 << 3` computation was supposed to be truncated to a a 32-bit value. This means that `%local0`, which can use up to 32-bits for an address, gets 3 extra bits of address space to be accessible via this `movl` instruction. The fix in Cranelift is to remove the erroneous lowering rules in the backend which handle these zero-extended expression. The above example is then translated to `movl %local0, %temp; shl $3, %temp; movl (%base, %temp), %dst` which correctly truncates the intermediate computation of `%local0 << 3` to 32-bits inside the `%temp` register which is then added to the `%base` value. Wasmtime version 4.0.1, 5.0.1, and 6.0.1 have been released and have all been patched to no longer contain the erroneous lowering rules. While updating Wasmtime is recommended, there are a number of possible workarounds that embedders can employ to mitigate this issue if updating is not possible. Note that none of these workarounds are on-by-default and require explicit configuration: 1. The `Config::static_memory_maximum_size(0)` option can be used to force all accesses to linear memory to be explicitly bounds-checked. This will perform a bounds check separately from the address-mode computation which correctly calculates the effective address of a load/store. Note that this can have a large impact on the execution performance of WebAssembly modules. 2. The `Config::static_memory_guard_size(1 << 36)` option can be used to greatly increase the guard pages placed after linear memory. This will guarantee that memory accesses up-to-34G away are guaranteed to be semantically correct by reserving unmapped memory for the instance. Note that this reserves a very large amount of virtual memory per-instances and can greatly reduce the maximum number of concurrent instances being run. 3. If using a non-x86_64 host is possible, then that will also work around this bug. This bug does not affect Wasmtime's or Cranelift's AArch64 backend, for example.
CVE-2023-27477 1 Bytecodealliance 2 Cranelift-codegen, Wasmtime 2023-12-10 N/A 4.3 MEDIUM
wasmtime is a fast and secure runtime for WebAssembly. Wasmtime's code generation backend, Cranelift, has a bug on x86_64 platforms for the WebAssembly `i8x16.select` instruction which will produce the wrong results when the same operand is provided to the instruction and some of the selected indices are greater than 16. There is an off-by-one error in the calculation of the mask to the `pshufb` instruction which causes incorrect results to be returned if lanes are selected from the second vector. This codegen bug has been fixed in Wasmtiem 6.0.1, 5.0.1, and 4.0.1. Users are recommended to upgrade to these updated versions. If upgrading is not an option for you at this time, you can avoid this miscompilation by disabling the Wasm simd proposal. Additionally the bug is only present on x86_64 hosts. Other platforms such as AArch64 and s390x are not affected.
CVE-2022-31146 1 Bytecodealliance 2 Cranelift-codegen, Wasmtime 2023-12-10 N/A 8.8 HIGH
Wasmtime is a standalone runtime for WebAssembly. There is a bug in the Wasmtime's code generator, Cranelift, where functions using reference types may be incorrectly missing metadata required for runtime garbage collection. This means that if a GC happens at runtime then the GC pass will mistakenly think these functions do not have live references to GC'd values, reclaiming them and deallocating them. The function will then subsequently continue to use the values assuming they had not been GC'd, leading later to a use-after-free. This bug was introduced in the migration to the `regalloc2` register allocator that occurred in the Wasmtime 0.37.0 release on 2022-05-20. This bug has been patched and users should upgrade to Wasmtime version 0.38.2. Mitigations for this issue can be achieved by disabling the reference types proposal by passing `false` to `wasmtime::Config::wasm_reference_types` or downgrading to Wasmtime 0.36.0 or prior.
CVE-2022-31169 1 Bytecodealliance 2 Cranelift-codegen, Wasmtime 2023-12-10 N/A 7.5 HIGH
Wasmtime is a standalone runtime for WebAssembly. There is a bug in Wasmtime's code generator, Cranelift, for AArch64 targets where constant divisors can result in incorrect division results at runtime. This affects Wasmtime prior to version 0.38.2 and Cranelift prior to 0.85.2. This issue only affects the AArch64 platform. Other platforms are not affected. The translation rules for constants did not take into account whether sign or zero-extension should happen which resulted in an incorrect value being placed into a register when a division was encountered. The impact of this bug is that programs executing within the WebAssembly sandbox would not behave according to the WebAssembly specification. This means that it is hypothetically possible for execution within the sandbox to go awry and WebAssembly programs could produce unexpected results. This should not impact hosts executing WebAssembly but does affect the correctness of guest programs. This bug has been patched in Wasmtime version 0.38.2 and cranelift-codegen 0.85.2. There are no known workarounds.
CVE-2022-31104 1 Bytecodealliance 2 Cranelift-codegen, Wasmtime 2023-12-10 6.8 MEDIUM 5.6 MEDIUM
Wasmtime is a standalone runtime for WebAssembly. In affected versions wasmtime's implementation of the SIMD proposal for WebAssembly on x86_64 contained two distinct bugs in the instruction lowerings implemented in Cranelift. The aarch64 implementation of the simd proposal is not affected. The bugs were presented in the `i8x16.swizzle` and `select` WebAssembly instructions. The `select` instruction is only affected when the inputs are of `v128` type. The correspondingly affected Cranelift instructions were `swizzle` and `select`. The `swizzle` instruction lowering in Cranelift erroneously overwrote the mask input register which could corrupt a constant value, for example. This means that future uses of the same constant may see a different value than the constant itself. The `select` instruction lowering in Cranelift wasn't correctly implemented for vector types that are 128-bits wide. When the condition was 0 the wrong instruction was used to move the correct input to the output of the instruction meaning that only the low 32 bits were moved and the upper 96 bits of the result were left as whatever the register previously contained (instead of the input being moved from). The `select` instruction worked correctly if the condition was nonzero, however. This bug in Wasmtime's implementation of these instructions on x86_64 represents an incorrect implementation of the specified semantics of these instructions according to the WebAssembly specification. The impact of this is benign for hosts running WebAssembly but represents possible vulnerabilities within the execution of a guest program. For example a WebAssembly program could take unintended branches or materialize incorrect values internally which runs the risk of exposing the program itself to other related vulnerabilities which can occur from miscompilations. We have released Wasmtime 0.38.1 and cranelift-codegen (and other associated cranelift crates) 0.85.1 which contain the corrected implementations of these two instructions in Cranelift. If upgrading is not an option for you at this time, you can avoid the vulnerability by disabling the Wasm simd proposal. Additionally the bug is only present on x86_64 hosts. Other aarch64 hosts are not affected. Note that s390x hosts don't yet implement the simd proposal and are not affected.
CVE-2021-32629 1 Bytecodealliance 1 Cranelift-codegen 2023-12-10 4.6 MEDIUM 8.8 HIGH
Cranelift is an open-source code generator maintained by Bytecode Alliance. It translates a target-independent intermediate representation into executable machine code. There is a bug in 0.73 of the Cranelift x64 backend that can create a scenario that could result in a potential sandbox escape in a Wasm program. This bug was introduced in the new backend on 2020-09-08 and first included in a release on 2020-09-30, but the new backend was not the default prior to 0.73. The recently-released version 0.73 with default settings, and prior versions with an explicit build flag to select the new backend, are vulnerable. The bug in question performs a sign-extend instead of a zero-extend on a value loaded from the stack, under a specific set of circumstances. If those circumstances occur, the bug could allow access to memory addresses upto 2GiB before the start of the Wasm program heap. If the heap bound is larger than 2GiB, then it would be possible to read memory from a computable range dependent on the size of the heaps bound. The impact of this bug is highly dependent on heap implementation, specifically: * if the heap has bounds checks, and * does not rely exclusively on guard pages, and * the heap bound is 2GiB or smaller * then this bug cannot be used to reach memory from another Wasm program heap. The impact of the vulnerability is mitigated if there is no memory mapped in the range accessible using this bug, for example, if there is a 2 GiB guard region before the Wasm program heap. The bug in question performs a sign-extend instead of a zero-extend on a value loaded from the stack, when the register allocator reloads a spilled integer value narrower than 64 bits. This interacts poorly with another optimization: the instruction selector elides a 32-to-64-bit zero-extend operator when we know that an instruction producing a 32-bit value actually zeros the upper 32 bits of its destination register. Hence, we rely on these zeroed bits, but the type of the value is still i32, and the spill/reload reconstitutes those bits as the sign extension of the i32’s MSB. The issue would thus occur when: * An i32 value in a Wasm program is greater than or equal to 0x8000_0000; * The value is spilled and reloaded by the register allocator due to high register pressure in the program between the value’s definition and its use; * The value is produced by an instruction that we know to be “special” in that it zeroes the upper 32 bits of its destination: add, sub, mul, and, or; * The value is then zero-extended to 64 bits in the Wasm program; * The resulting 64-bit value is used. Under these circumstances there is a potential sandbox escape when the i32 value is a pointer. The usual code emitted for heap accesses zero-extends the Wasm heap address, adds it to a 64-bit heap base, and accesses the resulting address. If the zero-extend becomes a sign-extend, the program could reach backward and access memory up to 2GiB before the start of its heap. In addition to assessing the nature of the code generation bug in Cranelift, we have also determined that under specific circumstances, both Lucet and Wasmtime using this version of Cranelift may be exploitable. See referenced GitHub Advisory for more details.