Total
4 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2022-47522 | 2 Ieee, Sonicwall | 59 Ieee 802.11, Soho 250, Soho 250 Firmware and 56 more | 2023-12-10 | N/A | 7.5 HIGH |
| The IEEE 802.11 specifications through 802.11ax allow physically proximate attackers to intercept (possibly cleartext) target-destined frames by spoofing a target's MAC address, sending Power Save frames to the access point, and then sending other frames to the access point (such as authentication frames or re-association frames) to remove the target's original security context. This behavior occurs because the specifications do not require an access point to purge its transmit queue before removing a client's pairwise encryption key. | |||||
| CVE-2020-24587 | 6 Arista, Cisco, Debian and 3 more | 332 C-100, C-100 Firmware, C-110 and 329 more | 2023-12-10 | 1.8 LOW | 2.6 LOW |
| The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed. | |||||
| CVE-2020-24588 | 8 Arista, Cisco, Debian and 5 more | 350 C-100, C-100 Firmware, C-110 and 347 more | 2023-12-10 | 2.9 LOW | 3.5 LOW |
| The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets. | |||||
| CVE-2020-24586 | 5 Arista, Debian, Ieee and 2 more | 44 C-200, C-200 Firmware, C-230 and 41 more | 2023-12-10 | 2.9 LOW | 3.5 LOW |
| The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that received fragments be cleared from memory after (re)connecting to a network. Under the right circumstances, when another device sends fragmented frames encrypted using WEP, CCMP, or GCMP, this can be abused to inject arbitrary network packets and/or exfiltrate user data. | |||||