Total
4 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v2 | CVSS v3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2022-27813 | 1 Motorola | 4 Mtm5400, Mtm5400 Firmware, Mtm5500 and 1 more | 2023-12-10 | N/A | 8.2 HIGH |
| Motorola MTM5000 series firmwares lack properly configured memory protection of pages shared between the OMAP-L138 ARM and DSP cores. The SoC provides two memory protection units, MPU1 and MPU2, to enforce the trust boundary between the two cores. Since both units are left unconfigured by the firmwares, an adversary with control over either core can trivially gain code execution on the other, by overwriting code located in shared RAM or DDR2 memory regions. | |||||
| CVE-2022-26941 | 1 Motorola | 4 Mtm5400, Mtm5400 Firmware, Mtm5500 and 1 more | 2023-12-10 | N/A | 8.8 HIGH |
| A format string vulnerability exists in Motorola MTM5000 series firmware AT command handler for the AT+CTGL command. An attacker-controllable string is improperly handled, allowing for a write-anything-anywhere scenario. This can be leveraged to obtain arbitrary code execution inside the teds_app binary, which runs with root privileges. | |||||
| CVE-2022-26943 | 1 Motorola | 4 Mtm5400, Mtm5400 Firmware, Mtm5500 and 1 more | 2023-12-10 | N/A | 8.8 HIGH |
| The Motorola MTM5000 series firmwares generate TETRA authentication challenges using a PRNG using a tick count register as its sole entropy source. Low boottime entropy and limited re-seeding of the pool renders the authentication challenge vulnerable to two attacks. First, due to the limited boottime pool entropy, an adversary can derive the contents of the entropy pool by an exhaustive search of possible values, based on an observed authentication challenge. Second, an adversary can use knowledge of the entropy pool to predict authentication challenges. As such, the unit is vulnerable to CVE-2022-24400. | |||||
| CVE-2022-26942 | 1 Motorola | 4 Mtm5400, Mtm5400 Firmware, Mtm5500 and 1 more | 2023-12-10 | N/A | 8.2 HIGH |
| The Motorola MTM5000 series firmwares lack pointer validation on arguments passed to trusted execution environment (TEE) modules. Two modules are used, one responsible for KVL key management and the other for TETRA cryptographic functionality. In both modules, an adversary with non-secure supervisor level code execution can exploit the issue in order to gain secure supervisor code execution within the TEE. This constitutes a full break of the TEE module, exposing the device key as well as any TETRA cryptographic keys and the confidential TETRA cryptographic primitives. | |||||